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1 SIX TYPES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: 
THEIR AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT AND EMPLOYABILITY 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to identify a variety of employment relationships 
based upon an economy-wide, representative sample. We turn to psychologi-
cal contract studies examining different types of psychological contracts. We 
expand two existing typologies by incorporating multiple features or under-
lying dimensions of psychological contracts. Such a feature-oriented approach 
allows  us  to  construct  a  meaningful  conceptualization  of  employer  and 
employee obligations across different settings and to identify multiple types of 
psychological  contracts in which combinations of  different  dimensions are 
prevalent. The cluster analysis indicates the existence of six types of psycho-
logical  contracts,  all  having  different  patterns of  mutual  expectations:  an 
instrumental,  weak,  loyal,  unattached,  investing  and  strong psychological 
contract.  To  validate the  six-cluster  solution,  we develop  clusters' profiles 
based upon individual, job, formal contract and organizational characteristics 
and further differentiate between the clusters by examining their outcomes in 
terms of affective commitment and employability. 
2 Introduction 
During the last decade, the workplace has changed due to organizational tran-
sitions such as mergers and acquisitions, restructurings and downsizings and 
privatizations.  These  transitions  emphasizing flexibility  and cost reduction 
have  not  only  impacted  organizations  and  jobs  but  also  the  employer-
employee relationship, bringing about a new employment contract (Burke & 
Cooper, 2002). This new employment relationship is sometimes described as a 
'new deal' (Herriot & Pemberton, 1995), a 'protean' career (Hall & Moss, 1998) 
or  a  'boundaryless career'  (DePillippi  &  Arthur,  1994).  Employers  can no 
longer offer job security and long-term career opportunities but are respon-
sible for providing their employees an environment for growth and learning so 
they get the experience and training needed to be employable in the organiza-
tion or elsewhere. Consequently, the primary expectations towards employees 
are no longer focused on loyalty and commitment but on adding value and 
being responsible for one's own career (Hall & Moss, 1998; McCarthy & Hall, 
2000). 
While current literature is focusing extensively on discussing this new deal 
and its consequences, the question remains to what extent this new contract is 
widespread across employment relationships. It  is the purpose of this study to 
examine  employment  relationships  across  a  representative  sample  of the 
working population instead  of expert informants  or targeted  populations. 
Through using a stratified random sample, this study aims to identify a variety 
of employment relationships instead of the bipolar distinction of old versus 
new deals. 
One way to examine the new employment relationship is by approaching 
employment relationships as psychological contracts (Herriot, 2001; Rousseau, 
1995). This concept of psychological contract can be defined as an exchange 
agreement of promises and contributions between two parties, an employee 
and an employer. It contains an individual's belief regarding the mutual obli-
gations of both parties to the relationship (Rousseau, 1990; 1995).  Therefore, 
research on psychological contracts provides the opportunity to understand 
employment relationships by examining the  types of obligations that both 
parties have promised each other. It  can be argued that the initial anger at the 
breaking of the old deal of security for loyalty has given way to a recognition 
that  psychological  contracts  have  changed  (Herriot,  2001).  The  question 
however remains whether one can only distinguish between old and new psy-
chological contracts or whether multiple types of psycholOgical contracts can 
be distinguished. 
To  address this  question, we turn to psychological contract studies that 
examine  different types  of psychological contracts.  We  start by presenting 
3 Rousseau's (1990;  1995)  typology of transactional versus relational contracts 
and Shore and Barksdale's (1998)  typology of balance and level of obligation, 
and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these typologies in light of this 
study's purpose. We further build on these typologies by conceptualizing psy-
chological  contracts  in  terms  of  their  features  or  underlying  dimensions 
instead of their content. After having presented the features of psychological 
contracts used in this study, we discuss the large representative sample of 
1,106 employees more in detail. In the results section, we present the six cluster 
solution as well as its validation. This validation occurs through developing 
clusters' profiles based upon individual, job, formal  contract and organiza-
tional characteristics and through examining the clusters' outcomes in terms of 
affective commitment and employability. 
Types of psychological contracts 
To theoretically ground our search for multiple types of employment relation-
ships, we tum to studies on types of psychological contracts. We selected two 
typologies from our literature review. One well-known typology is the dis-
tinction between transactional and relational contracts (Rousseau, 1990; 1995). 
A second, more recent, typology is developed by Shore and Barksdale (1998) 
focusing on the degree of balance and the level of obligations. We present both 
typologies and discuss their strengths and weaknesses in light of this study's 
aim. 
Transactional versus relational contracts 
Rousseau (1990; 1995) has been one of the first researchers to distinguish two 
sorts of psychological contracts: transactional and relational contracts. Their 
different characterization is due to  their different orientation towards time 
frame and tangibility. Transactional  psychological contracts are characterized 
by a short-term employment relationship in which the performance require-
ments or mutual obligations can be unambiguously specified. They are fairly 
specific and economic in nature. In contrast, relational  contracts are charac-
terized by long-term employment relationships in which the mutual obliga-
tions  cannot  be  unambiguously  specified.  They  are  both  economic  and 
social!  emotional in nature, less clearly specified and to a degree open-ended 
(Rousseau, 1995). The two other types - balanced or team player and transitional -
that can be derived from combining the dimensions of time frame and tangi-
bility are less discussed types of psychological contracts. 
The strength of this well-accepted  typology mainly lies in its theoretical 
nature. The two dimensions - time frame and tangibility - that form the basis 
of the typology are two of the five dimensions that seem to differentiate con-
4 tracts most commonly (Macneil, 1985; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1993). At the 
same time, by only considering two dimensions and leaving out the dimen-
sions of scope, focus and stability, the completeness of this typology can be 
questioned.  Another  weakness  relates  to  empirical  research  attempting to 
identify transactional and relational  contracts.  Empirical  studies  (Rousseau, 
1990; Robinson, Kraatz & Rousseau, 1994) have encountered a main difficulty 
of finding stable factor  structures across  different studies. For instance, the 
items of training, career development, working extra hours and engagement in 
voluntary extra-role activities were in the first study (Rousseau, 1990)  inter-
preted as elements measuring a transactional psychological contract whereas 
in the  second study (Robinson  et al.,  1994)  they belonged  to  a  relational 
psychological contract. However, this difficulty of finding stable types across 
time and settings may not be due to lack of theoretical relevance but to the 
way of  operationalising psychological  contracts.  Although  the  typology is 
constructed using dimensions, psychological contracts were operationalized in 
a  content-oriented  approach  focusing  on  individual  contract  elements  or 
terms. This implies the measuring of discrete obligations such as high payor 
enriched job. Consequently, factor structures based upon one population have 
not  been  particularly  stable  when  cross-validated  on  another  population 
(Barksdale  &  Shore, 1997).  It is  therefore that a  feature-oriented  approach 
which compares the contract to some attribute or dimension such as the degree 
to  which  the  contract is  implicit/explicit or stable/unstable over  time,  is 
discussed  as  an opportunity for  further  research  (Rousseau  &  Tijoriwala, 
1998). We further discuss the advantages of such a feature-oriented approach 
when presenting our conceptualization and operationalization of psychologi-
cal contracts. 
Degree of balance and level of obligation 
A  second  typology  of  psychological  contracts  is  developed  by  Shore  & 
Barksdale (1998). With this model, Shore & Barksdale (1998) want to cope with 
the problem of content of psychological contracts and shift the focus to more 
general characteristics which are less situation-bound. They therefore use the 
two underlying dimensions of degree of balance in employee and employer 
obligations  and  the  level  of  obligations.  Following  Blau's  (1964)  social 
exchange theory, Shore & Barksdale (1998) consider psychological contracts as 
balanced  if  the  perceived  obligations  of  the  employee  and  those  of the 
employer are at the same level. They define the level of obligation as the extent 
to which the employee and the employer feel obligated to fulfill a particular 
contract term. Following these two dimensions, four types of psychological 
contracts  are  identified:  mutual high  obligations,  mutual  low obligations, 
employee over-obligation, and employee under-obligation. 
5 In case of mutual high obligations, the psychological contract is balanced and 
both parties have high obligations. According to Shore & Barksdale (1998) this 
type of psychological contract yields the best results in terms of the employees' 
affective involvement, their intention to stay or leave, their perception of their 
future with their organization and the perceived support that they receive 
from the organization. In contrast, a psychological contract of mutual low obli-
gations  is characterized by balance but with both parties having low obliga-
tions.  Due to  the  low perceived  employee  obligations,  Shore  &  Barksdale 
(1998)  argue that this type of psychological contract yields poorer results for 
the organization than the previous type. The two other types of contracts are 
not balanced: employee over-obligation and employee under-obligation. Because of 
the unbalance and low employee obligations, this last type of psychological 
contract is expected to yield the poorest results of all types. Shore & Barksdale 
(1998)  further  argue  that  unbalanced  psychological  contracts  occur  less 
frequently and are only temporary. This argument is based on Blau (1964), 
who states that a balance in exchange relationships can be expected, since the 
parties will automatically feel  obliged to give something in return for  what 
they receive. 
The main strength of this typology is indeed its meaningful conceptualiza-
tion in terms of general characteristics. Although their study was restricted to a 
targeted  population  of  working  MBA  students,  this  approach  offers  the 
promise  of  generalizability  across  samples.  However,  a  weakness  of this 
typology may be that their typology is defined in too general characteristics. 
Within one type of psychological contract, it is possible to discover further dif-
ferentiations. For instance, mutual high obligations can refer to a situation in 
which both employees and employers show high obligations with respect to 
the dimension of time frame leading to an exchange of loyalty versus job secu-
rity. Or it can refer to high mutual obligations with respect to the dimension of 
scope leading to an exchange of personal investment versus organizational 
support. A second weakness is their argument that unbalanced psychological 
contracts are only temporary and occur less frequently. This statement further 
assumes that employees  have the power to  re-negotiate their employment 
relationship  or even change employers. While  this  may be the case  when 
studying MBA students, unbalanced psychological contracts may occur more 
frequently when studying a representative working population. 
Conclusion 
In examining a  variety of psychological contracts, we want to build on the 
strengths of these  two  typologies  as  well  as  avoid their weaknesses.  This 
implies, at the conceptual level, that we rely on theoretical features or dimen-
sions  of psychological  contracts just as  in Rousseau's  typology.  However, 
while Rousseau considered only two dimensions - time frame and tangibility, 
6 we broaden our investigation to multiple dimensions which will allow us to 
explore  more than 4  types of psychological  contracts.  Second, we want to 
incorporate the notion of balance as in Shore & Barksdale's (1998)  typology. 
This means that we examine not only employee obligations but also employer 
obligations as perceived by the individual. At the operational level, we move 
away from a content-oriented approach measuring individual contract terms 
because of its problems in generalizability across settings. Second, we want to 
examine a large, representative sample instead of samples using expert infor-
mants (human resource managers, Rousseau, 1990)  or targeted populations 
(business students, Shore &  Barksdale, 1998; nurses, Rousseau &  Tijoriwala, 
1996). 
A feature-based conceptualization of psychological contracts 
In this study we adopt a  feature-oriented assessment of psychological con-
tracts.  Although it is  widely recognized that feature-oriented measures are 
potentially important for  understanding the nature of employment relation-
ships, they are still underdeveloped (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1996). As previ-
ously defined, this type of assessment compares psychological contracts to one 
or more underlying attributes or dimensions (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998). 
Compared to a content-oriented approach which tends to focus on measuring 
the quality of employment using specific terms, this approach suggests that 
quality can take a variety of forms. The forms or dimensions that we include 
are  time  frame,  tangibility,  scope,  stability,  individualization  and  power 
distance.  While  the first  four  dimensions are adopted from the theoretical 
framework of Rousseau and McLean Parks  (1993)  and originally based on 
Macneil's (1985) contract theory, the two latter ones are derived from review-
ing 13 nation-studies on psychological contracts (Rousseau & Schalk, 2000; Sels 
et al., in revision). We briefly discuss the theoretical meanings of the 6 dimen-
sions. 
Following Rousseau and McLean Parks (1993)  we define time frame  as the 
perceived duration of the employment relationship. This dimension is  con-
sidered a crucial criterion in distinguishing several types of employment rela-
tionships, such as a relational or transactional contract (Rousseau, 1995), a clan 
or market relationship  (Beer  et al.,  1984),  or a  make or buy relationship 
(Williamson, 1985). Tangibility, the second dimension, is defined as the degree 
to which the employee perceives the terms of the contract as unambiguously 
defined and explicitly specified  (McLean Parks, Kidder &  Gallagher, 1998). 
The dimension of scope  refers to the extent to which the boundary between 
one's  employment relationship  and  other  aspects  of  one's  life  is  seen  as 
permeable (McLean Parks et al., 1998). Stability, the fourth and last dimension 
of psychological contracts derived from Macneil's contract theory (1985),  is 
7 defined as the degree to which the psychological contract is limited in terms of 
its ability to evolve and change without an implied renegotiation of the terms. 
Reviewing the different portrayals of psychological contracts in different 
countries  (Rousseau  &  Schalk,  2000),  we identified  two  other  dimensions 
necessary for  a  full  understanding of  all  possible  features  associated  with 
psychological contracts: power distance and individualization. The dimension 
of power distance is mainly illustrated through concepts such as hierarchy and 
inequality.  Expectations  concerning  the  degree  of  power  distance  can  be 
shaped both by employers and employees. Unequal treatment of employees 
through  privileges  or  differential  status  treatment,  a  formal  relationship 
between different hierarchical levels, formal ways of addressing persons, and a 
paternalistic management style are all employer practices which create expec-
tations of a high power distance relationship. Employees can promote a high 
power distance relationship by accepting the authority of hierarchy, adopting 
a conformist attitude and respecting orders. The dimension of individualization 
has already been suggested by Guest (1998) as a possible important dimension 
to understand the nature of psychological contracts. Individualization refers to 
the distinction between individually regulated versus collectively regulated 
employment relationships.  An individually regulated employment relation-
ship refers to the possibility of individual negotiation or, in other words, indi-
vidual arrangements can be made which deviate from the norm. In contrast, in 
a  collectively  regulated  relationship,  little  or  no  individual  negotiation  is 
possible because all employment aspects have been decided on collectively. 
Constructing reliable psychological contract scales 
Following our definition of psychological contracts, each of the six dimensions 
was operationalized in terms of employee obligations as well as employer obliga-
tions.  All  61  items  assessing  the  employer obligations  (I  expect  from  my 
employer that  ...  ) and employee obligations (My employer can expect from me 
that...) were measured on five-point Likert-style response formats anchored 
by 'strongly disagree' and 'strongly agree'. The construction of reliable scales 
was conducted in three consecutive stages. 
In a first stage, scales were formed after two principal component factor 
analyses with varimax-rotation to assess the dimensionality of the items: one 
on the items measuring employer obligations and the second on the items 
measuring  employee  obligations.  In both  analyses,  a  five-factor  solution 
provided  the  most  conceptually  interpretable  factor  structure.  These  five 
factors met the selection criteria of eigenvalues greater than 1.0 with an inclu-
sion of at least three items.  Items with loadings above  .40  and low cross-
loadings were retained to construct scales (Hair, Tatham &  Anderson, 1995). 
Table 1 and 2 present the items, their loadings, and the theoretical psychologi-
cal contract dimension that each item was initially intended to measure. 
8 Table 1  Principal component analysis on employer obligations 
Items  Scale (dimension)  Factor  Items dropped 
based on CFA 
I expect from my employer that he ...  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5  F6 
offers me employment security  Long-term involvement (time frame)  .17  .68  .11  .10  .16  .01 
Makes a commitment to me for a long time  Long-term involvement  .17  .76  .07  .07  .09  .06 
offers me opportunities for career development  Long-term involvement  .09  .71  .03  .09  .1B  .02 
doesn't immediately fire me if things are going badly  Long-term involvement  .OB  .65  .26  .10  -.07  -.03  X 
offers me a transfer to another job if my current job would disappear  Long-term involvement  .13  .68  .OB  .06  .00  .03 
does everything in his power to keep me employed  Long-term involvement  .12  .62  .26  .14  .24  .09  X 
sets agreements regarding my work down in writing  Tangibility (tangibility)  .73  .03  .05  .04  .11  .04  X 
makes specific agreements regarding my work  Tangibility  .75  .04  .11  .11  .11  .01 
is very clear about opportunities for advancement in this firm  Tangibility  .63  .25  .19  -.01  .14  .03  X 
specifically describes the performance appraisal criteria used in this firm  Tangibility  .77  .16  .14  .03  .02  .01 
unambiguously describes my obligations within this firms  Tangibility  .81  .18  .14  .12  .06  .05  X 
unambiguously describes my rights within this firm  Tangibility  .77  .21  .14  .14  .12  .01 
personally supports me in difficult periods  Personal treatment (scope)  .19  .23  .59  .13  .26  .06  X 
appreciates me for what I do and for who I am  Personal treatment  .20  .22  .72  .13  .14  .04 
considers not only the end result but also my personal effort  Personal treatment  .20  .17  .70  .14  .17  -.01 
treats me as a person, not as a number  Personal treatment  .10  .10  .81  .20  .06  -.02 
allows me to be myself within this firm  Personal treatment  .10  .07  .75  .19  .15  -.04  X 
sticks to agreements despite changed circumstances  Carefulness (stability)  .24  .17  .21  .14  .65  -.03 
is flexible in applying agreements'  Carefulness  .07  .16  .26  .11  .69  .12 
considers made agreements as permanently valid  Carefulness  .17  .12  .15  .19  .78  .05 
gives differential benefits to superiors and subordinates  I  .04  .02  .03  -.08  -.01  .89  X 
allows managers in this firm to decide for their subordinates  I  .06  .09  -.03  .05  .12  .87  X 
treats all employees at the same level equally  Equal treatment (individualization)  .02  .12  .18  .79  .09  .01 
demands the same from all employees at the same level  Equal treatment  .08  .11  .14  .86  .07  .03 
regards agreements as applicable to the whole group, department or team  Equal treatment  .12  .11  .21  .77  .15  -.07 
applies the same benefits to all employees at the same level  Equal treatment  .14  .13  .16  .79  .14  -.02 
Explained variance (%)  14.4  12.5  12  11.1  7.4  6.1 
~- -
• Item is reverse 
9 Table 2  Principal component analysis on employee obligations 
Items  Scale (dimension)  Factor  Items dropped 
based on CFA 
My employer can expect from me that /  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5  F6 
enter into a long-term agreement with this firm  Loyalty (time frame)  .17  .11  .22  .12  .78  -.02 
accept a transfer to a different job in the organization if necessary  Loyalty  .00  .17  .06  .12  .76  -.01 
stay with this firm my whole career  Loyalty  .OB  .05  .16  .14  .83  -.01 
clearly state what is important to me in my work  Open attitude (tangibility)  .11  .12  .76  .12  .11  .07 
explicitly indicate my career wishes and plans  Open attitude  .14  .14  .73  .14  .16  .OB 
clearly indicate if problems arise  Open attitude  .OB  .20  .75  .12  .10  -.01 
make explicit agreements with my boss about work  Open attitude  .12  .15  .67  .23  .10  -.01  X 
am concerned about this firm, even outside working hours  Personal investment (scope)  .82  .12  .01  .06  .12  .09 
work extra hours when necessary  Personal investment  .79  .11  -.06  .02  .04  .13 
bring own ideas and creativity into this firm  Personal investment  .78  .19  .21  .02  .02  .04 
want to develop myseij in this firm  Personal investment  .71  .22  .2B  .14  .14  .OB  X 
invest time and energy in this firm  Personal investment  .70  .31  .22  .09  -.00  .03  X 
adjust easily to changes in my work situation*  Flexibility (stability)  .12  .74  .16  .14  .14  .07 
Tolerate changes when introduced in this firm*  Flexibility  .13  .80  .09  .13  .01  .02  X 
deal with unpredictable events in my work situation *  Flexibility  .21  .73  .1B  .13  .06  .02 
adopt a flexible aMude*  Flexibility  .32  .67  .20  .1B  .06  -.00  X 
accept if agreements are being revised*  Flexibility  .1B  .73  .11  .13  .OB  .14 
show respect for my superiors  Respect for authority (power distance)  .17  .22  .23  .66  .06  -.03  X 
adopt a formal attitude to my superiors  Respect for authority  .03  .11  .14  .78  .09  .06 
accept that management has a higher status than employees  Respect for authority  .04  .11  .12  .76  .13  .10 
adhere to the authority of superiors  Respect for authority  .05  .17  .12  .78  .12  .01 
have individual demands that are different than those from other employees*  /  .OB  .03  -.01  -.06  -.02  .89  X 
want to make individual arrangements*  /  .14  .15  .11  .22  -.02  .79  X 
Explained variance (%l  14.2  13.B  11.4  11.1  9  6.5 
* Item is reverse 
10 In a second stage, the dimensionality of the scales was assessed using two 
confirmatory  factor  analyses  (using  the  CALIS  procedure  in  SAS).  In 
evaluating the models tested, we considered four  goodness-of-fit measures 
(Hatcher, 1994). The initial assessments produced chi-square values of 515.74 
and 300 degrees of freedom (employer obligations) and 433.35 and 230 degrees 
of freedom (employee obligations), goodness-of-fit indices of 0.803 (employer 
obligations)  and 0.802  (employee  obligations)  and Bentler  &  Bonett's  NFl 
scores of 0.778 and 0.775 respectively, all indicating that the theoretical model 
was not fully supported by the data. Modification index values indicated that 
we could improve the model by dropping several items. The items dropped 
are indicated in the last column of Tables 1 and 2. Each of the goodness-of-fit 
measures  listed  in Table  3  indicate  that the  empirical  data conform both 
optimized  five-factor  models  (Hatcher,  1994).  In  addition,  the  optimized 
models contain no residual values significantly different from zero. Internal 
consistency of the final scales  was assessed by calculating  the Cronbach's 
alpha coefficient. 
The  third  assessment  of  the  factor  structures  occurred  through  cross-
validation. This approach follows the recommendations of DeVellis (1991) that 
researchers collect cross-validation data for any new scale on a new sample in 
order to ascertain whether previously obtained factor analysis results were the 
result of sample-specificity. We approximated this approach by repeating our 
confirmatory factor analyses for two sub-samples (Chang, 1999; Sharma, 1996; 
Bone, Sharma & Shimp, 1989), the first grouping all non-executive employees 
(n=893),  the  second  representing  executive  levels  (n=213)  (see  sample 
description). Each of the goodness-of-fit measures produced excellent results 
for both sub-samples (e.g. goodness-of-fit indices of 0.9580 and 0.9466 for the 
employee obligations factor  structures; and goodness-of-fit indices of 0.954 
and 0.941 for the employer obligations factor structures). 
Table 3  Goodness of fit measures 
Optimized model  Optimized model 
Employer obligations  Employee obligations 
Goodness of fit index  0.966  0.969 
Bentler's comparative fit index  1.000  1.000 
Bentler and 8onett's normed fit index  0.951  0.954 
Chi-square test (p-value)  1.000  1.000 
Employer and employee obligation scales 
The five scales in Table 1 represent perceived employer obligations. Factor 1 
contains four long-term involvement items (a=.79), representing the employee'S 
11 expectations concerning a long term involvement by his/her employer (time 
frame).  Factor  2  contains  three  tangibility  items  (a=.82),  measuring  the 
employer obligations regarding the clarity and transparency of the employee's 
rights and obligations and the mutual arrangements in the  context of the 
employment relationship  (tangibility).  Personal  treatment  is  the  third  factor 
(scope). The three items measure the extent to which the individual expects to 
be treated as a 'person' and not merely as an economic resource (a=.80). Factor 
4 is labeled carefulness  regarding arrangements  (stability). This three-item scale 
refers  to  the extent to which the employee  expects  that his/her employer 
attends to earlier agreed arrangements (a=.70). Factor 5 reflects equal treatment 
(a=.85).  These  four  items  assess  employee's  expectations  regarding  equal 
treatment of all employees by the employer (individualization). 
The five scales in Table 2 represent perceived employee obligations. Factor 1 
contains three loyalty items (a=.76), assessing the degree to which employees 
feel  obliged to stay with the organization for  a  long period of time  (time 
frame). The second three-item factor (a=.78), open attitude, measures the extent 
to which employees will be clear and open with regard to all aspects affecting 
the  employment  relationship  (tangibility).  Personal  investment  is  the  third 
factor. This scale (3 items, a=.81) measures the extent to which employees will 
personally invest in the organization (scope). Factor 4 contains three flexibility 
items (a=.79), referring to the extent to which employees feel obliged to adopt 
a  flexible  and  tolerant  attitude  towards  internal  organizational  changes 
(stability).  The last factor is named respect for  authority  (4  items, a=.77)  and 
measures  the  extent  to  which  employees  will  show  respect  for  higher 
authorities within the organization (power distance). 
As  mentioned  before,  we  added  two  dimensions  to  the  list  of  four 
psychological  contract  dimensions  developed  by  Rousseau  and  MacLean 
Parks  (1993):  power  distance  and  individualization.  Concerning  power 
distance,  the  results  of  the  exploratory  and  confirmatory  factor  analyses 
indicated  that  we  succeeded  in  developing  a  reliable  scale  for  employee 
obligations - namely 'respect for authority'. However, the items measuring the 
employer obligations concerning power distance did not result in a  reliable 
scale. The reverse holds for the dimension of individualization. A reliable scale 
was constructed for employer obligations -namely 'equal treatment'- but not 
for employee obligations. 
Validating clusters of psychological contracts 
The main aim of this study is to develop a variety of psychological contracts, 
based upon the 10 constructed scales, using cluster analysis. To validate and 
understand the different clusters of psychological contracts, we will develop 
12 cluster  profiles  as  well  as  assess  their  relationships  with  two  outcomes: 
affective commitment and employability. 
First, the cluster profiles will be based upon individual, job, formal contract 
and  organizational  characteristics.  These  characteristics  will  give  us  a 
demo  graphical description of the clusters through which we can increase our 
understanding of the meaning of the psychological contract types. Second, to 
further differentiate the clusters from each other, we examine the relationships 
between the clusters and affective commitment and employability. These two 
outcomes are important areas in which employment relationships may differ 
(Rousseau, 1995; Shore & Barksdale, 1998). We formulate here for each of the 
outcomes a  few  propositions in which the relationship  with psychological 
contract  dimensions  is  explicated.  It is  not  our  aim  to  be  exhaustive  in 
formulating propositions but to point to the relevance of these two outcomes 
to further differentiate the different types of psychological contracts. Affective 
commitment refers to the degree to which employees feel emotionally attached 
to the organization (Allen & Meyer, 1990). We expect that employee'S affective 
commitment will be high in those clusters that score high on the psychological 
contract dimension of time  frame.  The  extent to  which the relationship  is 
perceived to be long-term is likely to influence employee'S attachment to the 
organization, as found in relational psychological contracts (Rousseau, 1995). 
We  can  further  expect  high  affective  commitment  in  clusters  in  which 
employee  obligations  and employer  obligations  are  in balance.  Following 
Shore  &  Barksdale  (1998),  a  balanced  psychological  contract  contains  the 
element of reciprocity which in turn influences employee'S involvement in the 
organization. This relationship can be expected to be especially present when 
the level of obligations is high. This implies a high degree of investment made 
in the relationship through which the employee becomes more attached (Shore 
& Barksdale, 1998). High affective commitment has been viewed as a means by 
which employees can repay their employer for treating employees well (Shore 
& Wayne, 1993). 
Employability refers to the perceived ease of movement in the labor market 
(Trevor, 2001). We expect high employability in those clusters that score high 
on the dimension of scope, especially with respect to employee obligations. 
The  extent to which employees  are willing to  invest in work is  likely  an 
indicator of their willingness to keep learning and moving (Hall  &  Moss, 
1998), and consequently increases employees' employability. We can further 
expect high employability in clusters scoring low on the dimension of time 
frame.  The extent to which the relationship is perceived to be short-term is 
likely  to  increase  employees'  feeling  of self-reliance,  forcing  them to  take 
responsibility for their own career. Finally, high employability can be expected 
in clusters in which the individual regulation of employment relationships is 
stressed.  Clusters  with  a  strong  focus  on  individual  arrangements  may 
represent psychological contracts in which employees are expected to make 
13 personal  career  choices.  It  is  through  an  individualized  employment 
relationship that employees have to take responsibility for their own learning 
and development and search for ways to increase their employability. 
Method 
Sample 
The  original  population for  this  study consisted  of all Belgian  employees 
working in private, public, profit and non-profit organizations with at least 10 
employees. We excluded agency workers, employees with 'small' part-time 
jobs  (less  than  40%  of  a  full-time  job),  seasonal  workers,  trainees  and 
apprentices. 
A (disproportionally) stratified random sample was drawn, resulting in a 
realized sample of 1,106 employees: 36% from public sectors, education and 
public  utilities,  23.2%  from  manufacturing,  7.5%  from  the  construction 
industry, 10.7% from retail, hotel and catering sectors, and 22.6% from other 
commercial service sectors.  The stratification variables chosen were gender, 
age, sector of employment and type of the employment relationship. The latter 
of  these  variables  was  included  for  stratification  since  there  is  no  single 
dominant type of employment relationship in Belgium (Sels, Janssens, Van 
den Brande &  Overlaet, 2000).  One important distinction is  the difference 
between contract and statute, as two different mechanisms of formalizing the 
employment relationship. In the private sector, the employer and employee 
have  the  possibility of free  negotiation with respect  to  the  content  of an 
employment contract. In the public sector, a statute regulates the relationship 
with the employer. The content of this statute is unilaterally established by the 
government-employer.  There  is  no  question of 'autonomous expression of 
will', such as in the contractual relationship. A second distinction still very 
much present in the Belgian private sector is the difference between blue-collar 
workers, white-collar workers and executive levels.  The contract receives a 
very different content depending whether you belong to the first, the second 
or the third group. Labor law treats these categories differently for issues such 
as protection from dismissal, salary arrangements, the probationary period, 
guaranteed income,  etc.  Inclusion  of this  distinction in our survey design 
allows us to fully investigate the relevance of differences in 'formal contract' 
for the nature of psychological contracts. In order to have sufficient data for 
analyses  we needed to  select  larger samples from  the strata with smaller 
populations ('disproportional'), in casu from the 'executive level' stratum. The 
realized sample includes 209  civil servants (employed by statute), 326 blue-
collar workers, 358 white-collar workers and 213 employees at executive level 
(private sector). For cross-validation purposes, the first three categories ('non-
14 executives' sub-sample) were compared with the fourth category ('executives' 
sub-sample). 
The data were collected using a standardized questionnaire. Respondents 
were interviewed by a  total of 60  professional interviewers from a  private 
research office. All interviewers were very experienced in conducting face-to-
face interviews and received additional training from members of the research 
team. In order to minimize the risk of interpretation errors, we organized a 
briefing on the content of the questionnaire for each individual interviewer. 
Measures 
The  following  measures were used to  validate the cluster findings.  Socio-
demographic characteristics were used to develop clusters' profiles and two 
outcome measures were used to further differentiate the clusters. 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
First, individual characteristics were measured. They included age (in years), 
seniority (in years), level of education and trade union membership. Three 
educational levels were coded: lower (education until the age of IS), average 
(high school certification) and high (bachelor and master levels). Second, two 
job characteristics were measured. Hierarchical level was assessed through one 
of the four levels:  senior management, middle management, professional or 
operational. Pay level (net monthly salary) was coded at three levels:  ~ 1,239 
Euro,  1,240 - 1,979 Euro, and ;;::  1,980 Euro.  Third, the respondents' formal 
contract type was measured through asking them their occupational category: 
blue-collar worker, white-collar worker, executive, or civil servant. Finally, we 
included two organizational characteristics:  1)  the size  of the organization 
(small or 10 to 49 employees; medium-sized or 50-499 employees and large or 
500 or more) and 2) the sector of activity (industry including manufacturing 
and construction;  commercial  services  including retail,  hotel  and catering; 
public and non-profit sectors including education and public utilities). 
Outcome measures 
To further differentiate the Lypes of psychological contracts, we included two 
outcomes:  affective  commitment  and employability.  Affective  commitment 
was measured with 3 items from Allen & Meyer's scale (1990): I feel like part 
of  the  family  at  my  organization,  I  feel  emotionally  attached  to  this 
organization, and I feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization (a=.85). 
Employability as the perceived ease of movement in the labor market (Trevor, 
2001), was measured by three items: It will be difficult for me to find new 
15 employment  when  leaving  this  organization,  In  case  I'm  dismissed,  I'll 
immediately find a job of equal value, and I'm confident that I would find 
another job if I start searching (a=.80). 
Analysis 
To  construct a  typology of psychological  contracts,  a  cluster  analysis  was 
employed. We used Ward's method in SPSS, a hierarchical clustering method 
that  uses  euclidean  distances.  We  chose  Ward's  method  because  this 
minimizes the variation in each cluster and seeks to find clusters of equal size. 
Ward's method is also considered to be the most robust method (Aldenderfer 
& Blashfield, 1984). Since the number of clusters was difficult to deduce from 
the dendogram, we carried out a number of different cluster analyses, varying 
the number of clusters from 2 to 12. The solution with 6 clusters was chosen 
because of the clearly different pattern of the 10  dimensions and the high 
number of respondents allocated to one of the six clusters (1,049 of the 1,106). 
To  check  the significance  of the differences,  we used analysis  of variance 
(ANOY  A)  and post hoc analyses which were carried out on the basis of a 
Bonferroni test (p<.05). 
To  validate  the  clusters,  we first  profiled  them in terms  of the  above-
mentioned individual, job, formal contract and organizational characteristics. 
For  each  cluster  we  calculated  the  average  values  or  the  frequency 
distributions. On the basis of analysis of variance (ANDY  A)  or Chi-square 
tests  (X2),  we ascertained  whether the six  clusters  demonstrate significant 
differences in terms of the characteristics that we were studying. Post-hoc 
analyses were carried out on the basis of a Bonferroni test (p<.05). Second, 
hierarchical regression analyses were used to examine the clusters' outcomes 
in terms of affective  commitment and employability. The 6 clusters where 
transformed to dummy variables and six separate regression equations were 
conducted for  each of the two outcome variables. In each of the regression 
analyses we used a different cluster as reference category. We controlled for 
several variables in order to improve the robustness of the relationships. These 
control variables were age, gender, formal contract type, educational level and 
pay level. 
Results 
Six-cluster solution: Six types of psychological contracts 
The cluster analysis showed a 6-cluster solution, with 4 clusters being 'large' 
(203  till 241  respondents), 1 cluster being 'medium' (151  respondents) and 1 
cluster being 'small'  (44  respondents).  For each cluster, the average scores 
16 (ranging from 0 to 10) and standard deviations on the 10 scales are shown in 
Table 4. 
17 Table 4  Cluster solution: Means and standard deviations on  10 psychological contract scales 
Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5  Cluster 6  Total 
Psychological contract scales  (N=205i 19,5%)  (N=203i 19,5%)  (N=205; 19.5%)  (N=241; 23%)  (N=44i4%)  (N=151i 14.5%)  (N=1049; 100%) 
Employer obligations  X (SD)  X (SD)  X  (SD)  X (SD)  X  (SD)  X (SD)  X  (SD) 
Long-term involvement  7,64 (1,28)  7,04 (1,57)  9,32 (0.86)  9,42 (0,78)  4,50 (1,88)  8,05 (1,61»  8,18* (1,76) 
3,4>6>  1>2>5 
Tangibility  7,62 (1,26)  6,46 (1,66)  8,16 (1,49)  9,00 (1,31)  6,86 (1,83)  7,46 (1,58)  7,76* (1,71) 
4>3>1,6>2,5 
Personal treatment  8,68 (1,34)  7,29 (1,50)  8,98 (1,18)  9,72 (0,63)  7,89 (1,48)  9,09 (1,02)  8,74* (1,44) 
4>3,6>1>5>2 
Carefulness reg. arrangements  7,33 (1,21)  6,19 (1,34)  8,20 (1,33)  8,69 (1,57)  6,19 (1,27)  7,92 (1,57)  7,63* (1,67) 
4>3,6>1>2,5 
Equal treatment  8,84 (1,15)  6,77 (1,54)  9,05 (1,37)  9,19 (1,37)  7,08 (2,03)  8,88 (1,18)  8,49* (1,64) 
1,3,4,6>2,5 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------._----_.-
Employee obligations  X  (SD)  X  (SD)  X  (SD)  X  (SD)  X  (SD)  X  (SD)  X  (SD) 
Loyalty  6,58 (1,65)  7,07 (1,39)  9,48 (0,74)  9,54 (0,78)  3,54 (1,39)  8,13 (1,56)  8,02* (1,98) 
3,4>6>2>1>5 
Open attitude  7,90 (1,18)  7,20 (1,24)  8,31 (1,39)  9,74 (0,61)  7,71 (1,08)  8,54 (1,26)  8,35* (1,43) 
4>3,6>1,5>2 
Personal investment  4,73 (2,06)  5,74 (2,02)  4,74 (2,06)  8,20 (1,81)  7,22 (2,07)  8,56 (1,54)  6,38* (2,51) 
4,6>5>2>1,3 
Flexibility  6,86 (1,36)  7,09 (1,24)  7,43 (1,61)  9,21 (1,06)  7,44 (1,63)  8,63 (1,95)  7,83* (1,61) 
4>6>3,5>1,2 
Respect for authority  7,23 (1,34)  6,39 (1,47)  7,61 (1,75)  8,87 (1,40)  6,04 (1,88)  8,06 (1,38)  7,59* (1,75) 
4>6>1,3>2,5 
*p F(ANOV  A) < .05 
18 Concerning employer obligations, respondents in cluster 1 have average scores 
on all scales, except for equal treatment on which they score high. The scores 
regarding employee obligations also approximate the average, except those on 
personal investment and flexibility.  These  scores are far  below average. In 
other words, these employees have high expectations towards their employer, 
but  they  perceive  themselves  as  having  low  obligations  towards  their 
employer. Therefore, we label this type of psychological contract an 'instru-
mental' psychological contract. 
Respondents in cluster 2 have low scores on all  scales,  both concerning 
employer and employee obligations. On most scales they actually have the 
lowest score of the six clusters, namely on tangibility, personal treatment, care-
fulness regarding arrangements, equal treatment and open attitude. Due to 
these low scores, this psychological contract is called 'weak'. 
Respondents in cluster 3 score very high on two scales: equal treatment and 
long-term involvement. They have average scores on the other employer obli-
gations'  scales:  tangibility,  personal  treatment  and  carefulness  regarding 
arrangements.  Concerning  employee  obligations,  they  score  very  high on 
loyalty and very low on personal investment. They have average scores on 
open attitude, flexibility and respect for authority. Since the emphasis in this 
type of psychological contract is  on long-term involvement in exchange for 
loyalty, we call this type a 'loyal' psychological contract. 
Respondents in cluster 4 score  high on all scales,  on both employer and 
employee obligations. Except for their score on personal investment, respon-
dents in this cluster actually have the highest score of the six clusters on all 
scales. Due to these high scores, we call their contract a 'strong' psychological 
contract. 
Concerning employer obligations, respondents in cluster 5 have low scores 
on all scales, but particularly very low scores on long-term involvement. With 
regard to employee obligations, they also have low scores on most of them, but 
particularly on loyalty.  They have however rather high scores on personal 
investment. Due to the emphasis on low expectations concerning long-term 
involvement in exchange for little loyalty, we call this type an 'unattached' psy-
chological contract. 
Finally, respondents in cluster 6 have average scores on all employer obli-
gations' scales, except for equal treatment on which they score high. Regarding 
employee obligations, they also score average, except on personal investment 
and flexibility on which they score far above average. In other words, these 
employees have moderate expectations from their employer, while they per-
ceive themselves as having high obligations towards their employer. There-
fore, we call this type of psycholOgical contract an 'investing' psychological con-
tract. 
19 Validating the six-cluster solution 
Clusters' profiles 
To validate the clusters, we first developed profiles of the respondents in the 6 
clusters (see Table 5).  We  present the clusters having the most pronounced 
profile first, followed by clusters that are related but different. 
20 TableS  Profiles of the respondents in the six clusters 
CI1  CI2  CI3  CI4  CI5  CI6  All 
Characteristics  respondents 
Age (in years)  X  36.1  37.4  38.3  41.5  31.2  37.8  38.1* 
4>  1,2,3,6>5 




Level of education 
WW  25.2%  19.6%  31.8%  22.3%  4.7%  10%  21.7%+ 
Average  42.6%  36.2%  44.8%  38.2%  14%  31.3%  37.9%+ 
High  32.2%  44.2%  23.4%  39.5%  81.4%  58.7%  40.4%+ 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Trade union  56.6%  48.8%  66.2%  51.3%  31.8%  33.3%  51.3%+ 
membership 
Hierarchical level 
Senior management  1.9%  4.4%  1.5%  8.3%  15.9%  13.2%  6%+ 
Middle management  14.6%  15.8%  7.8%  20.8%  18.2%  13.9%  15%+ 
Professional  8.3%  12.3%  6.8%  10.8%  25%  13.2%  10.8%+ 
Operational  75.2%  67.5%  83.9%  60%  41%  59.6%  68.3%+ 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Net salary 
~  1,239 Euro  63.9%  58.6%  68.5%  48.5%  45.2%  43.5%  56.6%+ 
1,240-1,979 Euro  27.7%  32.3%  26.8%  34%  38.1%  38.6%  31.8%+ 
~  1,980 Euro  8.4%  9.1%  4.7%  17.5%  16.7%  17.9%  11.6%+ 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Formal contract 
Blue-collar worker  37.5%  28%  41%  24%  11%  17%  29%+ 
White-collar worker  36%  31%  28%  32%  46%  34%  33%+ 
Executive level  14.5%  23%  8%  22%  36%  30%  20%+ 
Civil servant  12%  18%  23%  22%  7%  19%  18%+ 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Sector 
Industry  31%  27.1%  30.9%  30.8%  15.9%  24.5%  28.6%+ 
Commercial services  34%  33.5%  30.4%  32.9%  61.4%  36.4%  34.4%+ 
Public/non-profit services  35%  39.4%  38.7%  36.3%  22.7%  39.1%  36.9%+ 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Size of the organization 
10-49 employees  22.5%  21.2%  12.2%  17.8%  27.2%  32.7%  20.8%+ 
50-499 employees  34.8%  26.1%  31.4%  24.9%  36.4%  22%  28.4%+ 
500 employees and more  42.7%  52.7%  56.4%  57.3%  36.4%  45.3%  50.8%+ 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
*p F(ANOV  A) < .05; +p )(2(Pearson, Chi-square) < .05 
A  first  pronounced profile  is  that of employees  with a  loyal  psychological 
contract (cluster 3), being poorly educated blue-collar workers or civil servants. 
21 These respondents have the lowest level of  education with 31.8%  of them 
having schooling only until the age of 15. They are mainly blue-collar workers 
(41%) or civil servants (23%), having operational jobs (83.9%). A large percent-
age is member of a trade union: 66.2% as compared to the average of 51.3%. 
Their net monthly salary is in the lowest pay category: 68.5% earn less than 
Euro 1,240  net per month.  Relatively more of them are employed in large 
organizations of more than 500 employees (56.4%). 
Employees with an instrumental psychological contract (cluster 1) have a low 
level of education, but not as low as those with a loyal psychological contract. 
They also have mainly operational jobs (75.2%) but they are both blue-collar 
(37.5%) and white-collar workers (36%). They are more employed in medium-
sized organizations (34.8%) with a net monthly salary in the lower pay catego-
ries, but not as low as employees with a loyal psychological contract. A large 
percentage is member of a trade union: 56.6% as compared to the average of 
51.3%. 
Unlike  employees  with an instrumental or loyal  psychological  contract, 
those with a weak psychological contract (cluster 2) have an average rather than a 
low level of education. They also have jobs at all hierarchical levels. The distri-
bution of their net monthly salary across the various pay categories follows the 
average distribution. In other words, the overall profile of the employees with 
a weak psychological contract is not very pronounced, having average scores 
on all characteristics. 
Another pronounced profile is that of employees with an unattached psycho-
logical contract (cluster 5), being young, highly educated white-collar or execu-
tive employees. They are the most educated employees of all  six clusters -
81.4% have a high educational degree-, with an average age of 31. They mainly 
fulfill  professional jobs (25%),  middle management jobs  (18.2%),  and even 
senior  management  jobs  (15.9%).  They  are  employed  in  the  commercial 
services (61.4%)  and in small and medium-sized organizations (respectively 
27.2% and 36.4%). Their net monthly salary is in the higher pay category. Only 
a small percentage of them are member of a trade union: 31.8%  versus the 
average of 51.3%. 
Employees with an investing  psychological  contract  (cluster 6)  have a  high 
level of education, but not as high as those with an unattached psycholOgical 
contract. However, their net monthly salary is in the highest pay category: 
17.9% earn Euro 1,980 or more net per month. Compared to the average, they 
have more senior management jobs (13.2%) and are more employed in small 
organizations (32.7%). Like employees with an unattached psychological con-
tract, only a small percentage is member of a trade union: 33.3% as compared 
with 51.3% on average. 
Finally, employees with a strong psychological contract (cluster 4)  are some-
what older than respondents in all other clusters (41.5 years) which is further 
reflected in their high seniority (15.3  years). Compared to the average, they 
22 have relatively more middle management jobs (20.8%) and more of them are 
civil  servants  (22%).  They  are  also  more employed in large organizations 
(57.3%). Their net monthly salary is in the higher wage categories: 17.5% earn 
Euro 1,980 or more net per month. 
Clusters' outcomes 
The results of the regression analyses examining the relationships between 
affective commitment and employability and the six clusters are presented in 
Table 6 and 7. In each of the models we compare the level of affective com-
mitment (1-6) or employability (7-12) of five (dummy scored) clusters with the 
remaining sixth cluster that serves as the reference category. 
23 Table 6  Results of hierarchical regression analyses: Affective commitment as dependent variable 
Reference category (intercept) = 
Intercept  Unattached  Weak  Instrumental  Loyal  Investing  Strong 
(Modell)  (Model 2)  (Model 3)  (Model 4)  (Model 5)  (Model 6) 
Unattached  /  -.036  -.037  -.078 *  -.197 ***  -.226 *** 
Weak  .000 1  /  .007  -.041  -.215 ***  -.263 *** 
Instrumental  .006  -.017  /  -.047  -.221 ***  -.268 *** 
Loyal  .075 *  .026  .031  /  -.175 ***  -.215 *** 
Investing  .245 ***  .234 ***  .238 ***  .208 ***  /  .009 
Strong  .329 ***  .319 ***  .323 ***  .287 ***  .103 *  / 
R2  .192 ***  .193 ***  .193 ***  .194 ***  .182 ***  .176 *** 
F  16,417 ***  16,553 ***  13,536 ***  16,624 ***  15,411 ***  14,780 *** 
'--- ------~-------- -- - - ---
Standardized Beta coefficients; * p < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001 
Control variables: age, gender, educational level, occupational category, pay level 
24 Table 7  Results of hierarchical regression analyses: Employability as dependent variable 
Reference category (intercept) = 
Intercept  Unattached  Weak  Instrumental  Loyal  Investing  Strong 
(Model 7)  (Model 8)  (Model 9)  (Model 10)  (Model 11)  (Model 12) 
Unattached  /  .073 *  .058  .108 ***  .065 *  .073 * 
Weak  -.075 *  /  -.003  .053  -.028  -.004 
Instrumental  -.037  .012  /  .052  -.019  .003 
Loyal  -.106 **  -.059  -.059 *  /  -.075 *  -.068 * 
Investing  -.057  .014  .020  .056  /  .014 
Strong  -.068 *  .003  .003  .030  -.020  / 
R2  .136 ***  .139 ***  .139 ***  .138 ***  .139 ***  .139 *** 
F  10,893 ***  11,143 ***  11,134 ***  11,106 ***  11,151 ***  11,143 *** 
Standardized Beta coefficients; * p < .05; ** P < .01; *** p < .001 
Control variables: age, gender, educational level, occupational category, pay level 
25 Table 6 indicates that the levels of affective commitment in the two clusters of 
investing and strong psychological contracts are significantly higher than in 
the reference clusters of unattached (model I), weak (model 2), instrumental 
(model 3) and loyal (model 4) psychological contracts. As expected, the finding 
of high commitment in strong psychological contracts suggests that a  high 
level  of obligations  from both parties signals a  high degree of investment 
through which employees become more attached. Contrary to our expecta-
tions, unbalanced psychological contracts can show higher affective commit-
ment than balanced ones. The unbalance in investing psychological contracts 
did not seem to  prevent employees  from becoming  more attached  to  the 
employing organization compared to employees who find themselves in more 
balanced types such as the unattached (model I), weak (model 2)  and loyal 
(model  4)  psychological  contracts.  These  respondents'  high  score  on the 
employee obligations' scales of personal investment and flexibility seems to 
reflect an inherent willingness to become committed to an organization. 
While the cluster of loyal psychological contracts shows significantly lower 
affective commitment than the investing and strong ones (model 4), this type 
of contract scores significantly higher than unattached psychological contracts 
(model 1).  Because respondents in this cluster score high on both long-term 
involvement and loyalty, this finding confirms our expectation that obligations 
concerning  a  long  term  relationship  from  both  employer  and  employee 
increases employees' affective commitment. 
Table 7 presents the results of the relationships between the clusters and 
employability. They indicate that respondents with an unattached psychologi-
cal  contract  score  higher  on employability  than respondents with a  weak 
(model 8), loyal (model 10), investing (model 11) and also strong (model 12) 
psychological contract. Comparing unattached with loyal and weak psycho-
logical contracts, the finding suggests that the level of personal investment 
may differentiate between these types of psychological contract. Respondents 
with a loyal and weak psychological contract score very low on this  scale, 
compared to  the ones with an unattached psychological contract. However, 
respondents with a strong psychological contract score also high on personal 
investment but they show lower levels of employability than those with an 
unattached contract. 
Comparing  unattached  with  loyal  (model  10)  and  strong  (model  12) 
contracts further indicates that time frame and individualization may be two 
psychological contract dimensions differentiating between these types of con-
tracts. Employees with loyal and strong psychological contracts score high on 
long-term involvement and loyalty (time frame) as well as on equal treatment 
(individualization)  while unattached employees score low on these  obliga-
tions. So, the combination of low expectations regarding personal investment 
26 and high expectations regarding loyalty, long-term involvement and equal 
treatment seems to be linked with the lower employability of loyal employees. 
Discussion and conclusion 
This  study showed  a  variety  of psychological  contracts  when exanurung 
psychological  contracts following  a  feature-oriented  approach and across  a 
large, representative sample, covering different hierarchical layers and rele-
vant professional categories. Six different clusters were found - loyal, instru-
mental, weak, unattached, investing and strong psychological contracts, all 
having different patterns of employer and employee obligations, a different 
profile and different levels of affective commitment and employability. Affec-
tive commitment was mainly found in the clusters of strong, investing and 
loyal psychological contracts. Besides the level of obligations, it seems that the 
employer obligation of long term involvement and the employee obligation of 
personal investment, flexibility and loyalty are related to high affective com-
mitment. Employability was higher for  employees with an unattached psy-
chological contract, compared to those with loyal, weak and strong psycho-
logical contracts. Here, it seems that the combination of the employer obliga-
tions  of short-term investment and individual treatment and the employee 
obligations of personal investment and short-term perspective are related to 
their perceived ease of movement in the labor market. They are also young 
and highly educated white-collar or executive employees. 
A major contribution of a feature-based approach of psychological contracts 
is that  it allowed us to study employer and employee obligations across a 
variety of settings. Through examining obligations using the six dimensions of 
time frame, tangibility, scope, stability, individualization and power distance, 
we were able to construct a meaningful conceptualization for all four profes-
sional  categories in our sample:  blue-collar workers,  white-collar workers, 
executives and civil servants. This feature-oriented approach further allowed 
us to identify multiple types of psychological contracts in which combinations 
of different dimensions are prevalent. Especially these combinations of dimen-
sions differentiate the findings of this study from those of Rousseau (1995) and 
Shore & Barksdale (1998). 
For instance, the long-term perspective of the relational contract (Rousseau, 
1995) can be found in three clusters: loyal, strong and investing psychological 
contract. Despite this similarity, the three clusters differ with respect to other 
dimensions. For example, employees with loyal psychological contracts score 
low on personal investment while employees with investing psychological 
contracts score high on this employee obligation. Employees with strong psy-
chological contracts score in between these two types. In addition, some of the 
clusters seem similar to Shore  &  Barksdale's (1998)  typology. For example, 
27 instrumental psychological contracts seem to correspond to 'employee under-
obligation.'  However,  the  latter  typology  only  indicates  the  existence  of 
unbalance while the findings of this study also indicate the specificity of the 
unbalance. Specifically, the unbalance in instrumental contracts is character-
ized by equal treatment by the employer versus low personal investment and 
flexibility from the employee. Similar, the unbalance of 'employee over-obli-
gation' psychological contract is complemented in this study by the specifica-
tion  of  the  particular dimensions  that  are  in  unbalance.  Employees  with 
investing psychological contracts have 'over-obligated' contracts but we also 
know that the unbalance is characterized by the employee obligations of flexi-
bility  and  personal  investment.  So,  a  feature-based  approach  allows 
researchers  to  examine  the  quality  of employment relationship  through  a 
variety of dimensions or forms. 
Despite  this  contribution,  there  are  some  shortcomings  in the  way we 
operationalized and measured the features.  Reviewing the 13  nation-studies 
organized by Rousseau  &  Schalk (2000),  we identified power distance and 
individualization as  two  additional relevant features.  However, no reliable 
scales could be constructed for  employer obligations with respect to power 
distance and employee obligations regarding individualization. The challenge 
for future research on psychological contract dimensions is to further study the 
relevance  of these  two  dimensions and their  operationalization.  A  second 
shortCOming refers to the exclusion of the employers' perspective in measuring 
the psychological contract dimensions. Future research including the employ-
ers' perspective may lead to stimulating questions concerning the covariation 
or differentiation of the two parties' perceived obligations. 
Considering the recent interest in the so-called 'new employment deal', this 
study points to the danger of studying small and selective samples such as 
employees of fast growing organizations in the new service industries, MBA 
students or alumni, and professional groups such as consultants. While these 
studies offer insight into the specific nature of this new employment relation-
ship, the selectiveness might lead us to a misrepresentation of the directions 
and speed of changes in psychological contracts. Based upon the findings of 
this study, we must conclude that, at least for the Belgian labor market, the 
transformation from traditional employment relationships towards a new deal 
is restricted to a very small group of young and highly educated professionals 
and managers. Employees with an unattached psychological contract, which 
resembles  the  so-called  new deal,  represent  only 4%  of the total  working 
population. So, the evolution of the employment relationship may not be that 
revolutionary. At the same time, we want to comment on the generalizability 
of these findings. This study is conducted in Belgium and certain conditions in 
this country may favor traditional employment relationships above new ones. 
For instance, the value of job security and the practice of collective agreements 
between trade unions and organizations are two important cultural and insti-
28 tutional elements (Sels et al., 2000) that tend to strengthen loyal psychological 
contracts. Future research may therefore want to explicitly consider the cul-
tural and institutional context when studying the transformation of employ-
ment relationships. The questions that arise are: Are the 10 scales as identified 
in this study relevant to understand the nature of psychological contracts in 
other cultural and socio-economic contexts?, Is the six-cluster solution trans-
ferable to other institutional settings?, and, Within each institutional setting, 
what is the relative importance of the respective clusters in terms of their size? 
Another reflection refers to the occurrence of investing and instrumental 
psychological contracts, two unbalanced contracts. Employees with these two 
psycholOgical contracts represent 34% of the respondents. This large number is 
in contrast with Shore & Barksdale's (1998) study where the number of people 
in the unbalanced exchange types was much smaller than the number in the 
balanced exchange relationship types. According to Shore & Barksdale (1998), 
this  small  number  of  unbalanced  contracts  is  consistent  with  the  social 
exchange literature which contends that people seek balance in exchange rela-
tionships (Blau, 1964).  However, this study questions the generalizability of 
this  argument. As pointed out earlier, it assumes that employees have the 
power to renegotiate their contract. This negotiation level may be especially 
low for employees with an instrumental psychological contract who have a 
low level of education, mainly operational jobs and a low net monthly salary. 
Employees with an investing psycholOgical contract are expected to have more 
negotiation power. They are highly educated, almost half of them fulfill senior 
and middle management or professional jobs, and they receive high salaries. It 
is therefore not very likely that lack of power is the main reason why these 
employees do not adjust their level of employee obligations or change towards 
other employers. Even more, this group of employees shows high affective 
commitment. This is  also  in contradiction with Shore &  Barksdale's (1998) 
study in which balanced contracts lead to better outcomes than unbalanced 
contracts. The reason why employees with investing psychological contracts 
show high affective commitment and don't seem to indicate a need to move to 
a more balanced psychological contract is difficult to identify. As previously 
mentioned, these employees show especially high employee obligations with 
respect to flexibility and personal investment. A speculation may be that cer-
tain personal characteristics such as career anchors are the main drivers of this 
type of psychological contract. Or otherwise, HRM practices stimulating com-
mitment may be in place in these employees' organizations. It  was beyond the 
scope of this study to examine the antecedents of types of psychological con-
tracts. However, future research may want to study the relationships between 
dimensions of psychological contracts and possible antecedents such as HRM 
practices and/  or individual characteristics. 
To conclude, a feature-oriented approach to psycholOgical contracts offers 
important opportunities to study employment relationships. In this study, it 
29 provided the possibility to examine multiple types of psychological contracts 
using a  representative sample. This led to meaningful clusters of employees 
having different perceptions of employer and employee obligations.  These 
clusters were further validated by comparing their socio-demographic profiles 
as well as by assessing their relationships with affective commitment and 
employability. 
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